The PA Superior Court has ruled that although probation officers had the authority to stop and frisk a third party in the residence of a supervisee, they lacked reasonable suspicion to suspect that criminal activity was afoot and the officer safety concern that was articulated did not justify the extent of the forcible seizure that occurred.
Gibson was in a residence of a supervisee (Scott) at the time probation and parole agents were conducting a scheduled residential check. Agents ultimately discovered Gibson to be in possession of a folding knife and two baggies of cocaine. Gibson challenged the discovery of those items by filing a Motion to Suppress which was denied by the trial court and this appeal followed.
Essentially, Gibson argued that “nothing about his presence signaled criminal activity” and that agents had no authority over him, and he was “free to leave, ignore, or be as curt as he wished” to the agents.
In its analysis, the Superior Court first concluded that agents did have ancillary authority to detain Gibson in the course of supervising Scott. However, further analysis led the Court to conclude that the agents lacked reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and they therefore lacked the authority to detain Gibson on that basis.
When one agent directed Gibson to stop as he walked away, Gibson’s failure to do so did not support the conclusion that reasonable suspicion of criminal activity was afoot. The Court noted that the relevant inquiry is whether an officer possesses reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before initiating a detention. The Court further noted that when the only factor cited by the agent was furtive movement that Gibson made toward his pants, that alone did not justify the conclusion that Gibson was engaged in any criminality.
That said, the Court also concluded that under the officer safety rationale, the totality of the circumstances justified a pat down of Gibson for weapons, even in the absence that he was engaged in criminal activity. However, “instead of informing Gibson that he needed to conduct a pat down, or even restrain him for that limited purpose, [the agent] allowed Gibson to exit Scott’s bedroom, ordering him to the living room.”
So, although a limited pat down for weapons may have been justified under the officer safety rationale, [the agent’s] actions did not further the goal of disarming Gibson. “Forcing Gibson to sit in a room against his will does nothing to dispel concerns that Gibson was, in fact, armed; it simply intrud[ed] on Gibson’s freedom to leave the premises and not engage the officers.”
Although the Court noted that it was “highly sensitive to officer safety concerns,” it also acknowledged that Gibson’s privacy interests also needed to be considered.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the trial court erred in denying suppression.
COMMONWEALTH V. GIBSON, 565 MDA 2024 (Pa. Super. March 19, 2025).
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S42022-24o%20-%20106309011303843166.pdf?cb=1
